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Designing Water Institutions  Successffultwater  institutions
require a delicate interplay
between administrative  and
Market Failures  market control. The complex
and Institutional Response  challenge for water profes-
sionals is  to design institutions
to deal with  the physical
peculiar,ties  of water in a way
that establishes  sensible  incen-
tives  and efficient use of
resources.
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Summary  findings
'T'o  foster economic efficiency, says Livingston, right,;  in response to( long-rull changes in demand.  Certainly
to water re.ources  must be both secure and flexible.  no one interested in economiiic  efficien-y woLild  stiggest
Designing  institutions  to deal with the physical  either a comiiplete  hali otn  tranisfers  or completely
peculiaritief  of water in a way that  establishies  sensible  turestt.ainied  transfers.  'I'he  difficulty  's to cinsure that
incentives  and efficient  resource  use is complicared.  water transactions  allow economic  development  and
Basically,  establishing  security  in water rights  do not imipose  externalities  on other water users.
requires protecting  water users  against  intrusion  by  Market Ilmlechaniisms  for water transfer can entail
others. This is challenginig,  since  water users  are  substantial  transaction  costs,  which  threaten to delay
naturally interdependent.  Security  does not mean  rhat  or stymie  transfers  altogether.  Moreover, third-party
one must be guaranteed an exact amount of water aii  and commuinity  etfects  continue  to cencern those
the time. Rather, it means  knowing  the probability  of  involved  in water transfers.  Loc;al  citizens  and officials
warer  aviilability  and beirg certain about allocation  raise issues  abouit  the distribution  of economic  activity
procedures under changing  circumstances.  rather than its aggregate  level  (economic  efficiency).
Economic  e'ficiency  in warer allocation  in response  Perhaps  these  issues  are negligible  when  the amcunt of
to short-term  suppiy  changes  (such  as droughts)  water transferred  is small  in proportion to total supply.
requires  that economically  sensitive  sectors  take  But when  the transfer  threatens  a community's
precedence  over less  sensitive  or more  adaptive  economic  base,  these  concerns  deserve  more
sectors. This  can be accomplished  through markets  or  consideration.
administratively (by government agencies or private  Successfiul  water institutions require a delicatr
water user groups). In a market  scheme,  rights must be  Interplay  between  administrative  and market control.
differentiated  according  to the probability  of receiving  Institutions  establish  the.  basis  for markets  and carn
water in times  of shortage.  Those wvith  high-valtue  uises  as.;ure  competitive  conditions.  WateX  agenicies  will
can then either acquire high-probability  righits  alwavs  he involved  in allocation,  given the economics
permanently  or negotiate  an optiorn  to be exercised  of scale  in cenltralized  water mariagement.  'The
only in drought  years.  challeingc  for water professionials  is to  structurt
There is le-s  agreemiienit  among experts  about how to  institLItionIs  so thiat thev fosrer souindl ocrm!ti
design institutions  to provide flexible water allocation  devclopment.
This  paper-a  product of the Agricilttiral  Policies  Division,  Agrictiltuire  and Natural  Resources  Department  -is  part
of a larger effort in the department  to provide guidance  on water reso-orces  nianagerrient.  Copies  of the paper are
available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington  )DC  20433. Please  contact Cicely  Spooner, room
N8.039, extension  30464 (25 pages).  December  199.3.
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Provided as background  to Th.e  Wo.ld Bank-  Watrc Policy Paper, January  13,  i992.  Tne
author has benefitted  from critical reviews by W. K. Easter, W. B. Lord, S. C. Nunn
and R. K. Sampath.DESIGNING WATER  INSTITUTIONS:
MARKET FAILURES AND INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE
INTRODUCTION
Efficient resource  use is increasingly central to the economir
well  being  of  individual  regions  and  countries.  Institutional
arrangements set the ground  rules for resource use. Institutions
are "ordered relationships among people which define their rights,
exposure  to  rights  of  other,  privileges  and  responsibilities
(Schmid, 1972, p. 893). They determine who has the right to claim
the benefits from resource use and who must bear costs  (Bromley,
1982).  Therefore,  institutions  establish  the  incentives,
information  and  compulsions  that  guide  behavior  and  determine
economic outcomes.
Institutional arrangements establish the basis for mLrket or
administrative  control over water.  At best.  institutions create
order  and  relative  certainty  for  water  users  which  facilitate
achievement of economic and social goals.  At worst, they establish
impediments  to efficient resource  use  and  significant resources
must be expended by individuals  to compensate for their obsolete or
poor  design  (North, 1987). The  structure  of water  institutions
continues  to be  important because while  significant  investments
have been  made  in water  facilities,  realizing  the potential  of
these investments requires appropriate institutional arrangements
to guide their use.
Institutions establish the interface between government and
market control over water resources. Broadly speaking, government
policies  establish  the  "rules  of  the  game"  and  simultaneously
define  the  range  over  which  markets  and  individual choice  can
operate.  Markets cannot  exist without some government control over
water resources; in  the absence of government there is  no basis for
binding contracts between individuals.  Water resource management
will always necessarily involve some mix of aovernment and market
control over the resource.
1The mix of government and market control over water depends,
of course, on a particular country and its cultural, political and
economic  history.  These  factors  obviously  also  influence the
prospects for institutional innovation. Any general statement  about
the mix of government and market control over water is bound to
have  its  exceptions.  Nevertheless,  in  general,  one  can  say
governments  are  usually  more  involved  at  macro  level  resource
management,  which  may  invclve identifying  priorities,  mediating
conflict and selective provision of services.
While i,&icro  level resource management often relies on private
organizations and markets, no small share of  water is  micro managed
directly by governments in many parts of the world.  In any case,
the ideal role of macro level government control over water is to
structure  institutions  such  that  externalities  are  taken  into
account,  thereby  "enabling"  individuals  to  manage  their  own
resource use efficiently.
Poorly  functioning  resource  institutiens  tend  to  generate
pressure for innovations in  policy.  It is common for institutional
arrangements to lag behind evolving technology and social values.
This phenomenon has been studied in general  (North, 1987; Ruttan
and Hayami,  1984) and in the context  of water policy  (Dunbar,
1977;  Livingston  and Ruttan,  1990;  Runge,  1987). One  important
question becomes which institutional forms should be corc dered in
addressing, and potentially resolving,  inefficient resou .ce  use.
Maass  and Anderson  (S17-c,  p.2)  state  that the fundamental
purpose  of  water  institutions  "is  to  provide  order  and
predictabliity  su  tLat  hatcr  users  can  realize  their  other  goals
related  to  income,  popular  control  and  social  justice  .. i.  Here,
the focus is on economic efficiency, meaning the facilitation of
economic development  that can be  sustained  over  the long term,
without  undue  environmental  or  social  disruption.  In  reality,
pursuit of strict economic efficiency may ne circumscribed by other
considerations including political and equity goals. Nonetheless,
understanding the impact  of alternative institutional arrangements
on economic efficiency is critical to informed decision making.
The peculiar characteristics of water resources pose special
challenges for institutional design.  Water resources are prone to
market failures that must be addressed by institutions in order to
yield efficient allocation and use.  Also, water allocations must
change  in  order  to  adapt  to  changing  physical  and  economic
circumstances. In order to facilitate sound economic development,
water institutions must create security and flexibility (Ciriacy-
Wantrup,  1956).  The first requirement concerns market failures;
the second pertains to reallocation.
2The objective of this paper  is to describe problems faced in
designing  tne  structure  of  water  institutions  and  to  discuss
institutions that have been found to be oarticularly successful
or unsuccessful  in dealing with  common  market  failures and  for
reallocating water in times of climatic  and economic change. The
following  section  discusses  markcet failures  endemic  to  water
resources  and  potential  institutional  responses  to  them.
Subsequently,  the topic  of  institutions  for reallocating  water
within  and between sectors ,will  be addressed.
WATER RESOURCES AND MARKET FAILURE
Economic  theory  suggests  that  under  specific  conditions,
markets  will  yield  accurate  incentives  and  foster  efficient
resource use.  These conditions are very restrictive, but may be
met  to  greater or lesser degree  in specific resource and goods
markets.  When particular conditions are not met, markets do not
yield  appropriate  incentives  and  "fail"  to  achieve  efficient
resource use (Randall,1983). In the case of water resources, many
assumptions  are violated insofar as water is fugitive, lumpy and
rife with externalities.  Moreover,  water use is often nonrival,
entails substantial  transactions costs and suffers from informat;on
deficiencies.
The physical nature of water alone violates a number of these
conditions,  and  institutional  and  technical  accommodation  are
necessary  to  render  efficient  markets  (Livingston,  li85).Two
central  conditions  necessary  for  a  market  system  of  resource
allocation  to function efficiently  include: 1) the resource user
must be certain of the quantity, quality,  location and timing of
resource availability,2) the resource must be perfectly divisible
and 3) resource use  must not effect, or be effected by, utilization
of the res, rce by another party.  Certainly, in the absence of
institutional control, these conditions are not met in the case of
water  resources. The  applicability  and  significance  of each  is
explained below.
The nature of the hydrologic  cycle determines water supply.
The distribution and form of that  supply  changes over space and
time, which effectively changes the supply of water available for
use  at  a  specific  site.  Extreme  within  year  variability  in
precipitation and streamflow tend to be the rule, rather than the
excepti_.. i..  supp  rTir4s  is esneciallv  true in arid regions e  xce  J...  "  . ..-  - -- e-v-  -
where water allocation is more critical.  Uncertainties as to the
physical  quantity  of  water  available  at  particular  times  and
locations impede efficient resource use by lessening the expected
value of  engaglng in water related  activities.
3The  fugitive  nature  of  water  also  creates  physical
uncertainty.  Without  institutions,  the  right  to  usa  water  is
gained solely through  capture in a canal or reservoir.  Under these
conditions  deferred  use  carries  no  guarantee  of  future
availability. Institutions  are necessary to establish the rules for
diversion  from streams for direct  use and for storage for later
use.
The  fact  that  water  is  "lumpy"  (i.e.  is  not  perfectly
divisible in  terms of storage or transportation) also poses special
problems for institutional  design. Water supplies exist in discrete
"chunks" and is naturally concentrated into site specific, common
pools  or  streams.  The  implications  are  dramatic.  First,  very
significant economies of scale exist in  pumping and delivery. Where
diversion  is necessary, individual  irrigators, for instance, are
usually unable to transport small amounts of water in isolation,
due  to  conveyance  losses. Tnerefore,  indivisibility means  that
water  allocation  and  usa  must,  by  necessity,  involve  group
decisions and actions.  Therefore management becomes a problem for
the group as a whole, rather than for specific individuals.
Second, lumpiness  also generates violation of perhaps the  most
important condition for  efficient water use: independent  production
and  consumption  functions.  Because  water  supplies  are
concentrated,  withdrawal,  consumption  and  return  flows  by  one
individual,  in all likelihood, effects the quality, quantity and
timing  of  supply  for individuals  downstream.  Without  Iequate
institutional  arrangements,  efficient  utilization  is  inhibited
because all costs imposed bv water users are not necessarily born
by  the  users  themselves.  That  is,  private  costs  and  benefits
diverge  from  social  costs  and  benefits,  which  yields  serious
distortions  in allocation.
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSE TO MARKET FAILURE: SECURITY
Societies  around  the  world  necessarily  (explicitly,
implicitly,  or by default)  establish  institutional arrangements
that govern water use.  Some systems utilize markets, with various
degrees  of  imperfection  and  efficiency.  Many  other  resource
allocation  systems lack market  mechanisms  all together. Whether
market  or administrative based,  some  regimes are more effective
than others in addressing  the characteristics of  water and creating
a system  of secure water rights necessary  for efficient resource
use. A few illustrative examples are presented below.
4Security Through Proportionality, Priority and Absence of Damage
Much  of  the  world  in  need  of  rigorous  water  management
experiences  extreme variability  in precipitation  and streamflow
throughout the year. In an analysis of 35 developing countries,
Cestti  (19J!)  reports  that  nearly  half  of  these  countries
experience  lo% variability  in rainfall.  Typically, this physical
uncertainty  has  been  dealt  with  through  a  combination  a
technological and institutional  accommodations, in  order to  produca
relatively secure water rights.
The technical aspect of creating security involves developing
storage  facilities  to  capture  water  during  periods  of  high
streamflow  (usually due  to spring  snow  melt)  and preserving  it
until times of lower streamflow and higher demand.  This activity,
in itself, greatly enhances the security of water availability.
Tha  institutional  approach  to  security  may  be  based  on
proportionality  or priority. In the case  of proportionality, the
insecurity  inherent  in variable water  supplies  is shared among
water  users  of a  given  supply.  Water  rights  are defined as a
percent of the water available  in any given year.  For example,
some localities in Australia use the concept of "capacity sharing 
to  reduce  uncertainty  (Dudley, 1991).  Share  holders  in a dam
project  receive  a  certain  percentage  of  dam  capacity  and
streamflow.  While the percentage is constant, the actual quantity
of water  received will vary  from year to year. In tiis way, the
structure of water rights spreads the risk of variability equally
among share holders.
An alternative approach to the security issue is represented
by the concept of priority in time, as used in the Western U. S.
Actually, the approach is two-fold. First, the doctrine of prior
appropriation (in  contrast to riparian water rights) addresses the
market  failure  of  uncertainty  in  supply.  The  appropriation
doctrine  simply  stipulate  that  senior  (prior) water  rights  are
fulfilled before junior rights, which are acquired later in time.
Thus, based on temporal priority, a water user can be relatively
certain about the prospects  for receiving  water  in a particular
year.  The more junior the right  the less likely that right is to
be fulfilled.
Second, the joint problems of indivisibility and interdependce
are addressed by the far-reaching doctrine of "absence of damage".
This principle dictates that the appropriation of a new water right
cannot  in any way damage existing rights.  In this way, existing
water users can be secure in the knowledge  that subsequent right
holders  cannot  adversely  effect  the  quality  or  quantity  of
streamflow available to them. Because many surface and subsurface
water  supplies are physically connected, this principle has been
extended  to  apply  to  conlunctive  managemenrt  of  surface  and
groundwater  (Young, Daubert and Morel-Seytoux,  1986).
5In the Western U.S., a water right must be continually used in
order  to  be  valid.  Non-use  results  in  "abandonment"  or
"forfeiture". 'l.,is  principle has a two pronged effect on security
and  therefore  water  allocation.  Some  economists  argue that  in
order to protect the security of a water right, right holders use
their  maximum  entitlement,  regardless  of  need.  This  3ncentive
results in overuse of water resources.  On the other hand, these
loss doctrines are necessary in order to prevent "sleeper rights",
which introduce uncertainty into the overall system.
Enforcement e- these doctrines  requires both technology and
institutions. The number of senior rights expected to be fulfilled
in  a  given  year  is  determined  by  snowpack  measurements  and
sat,dllite  monitoring of streamflows. Water commissioners are "river
cops" who also monitor water withdrawals to ensure actual use and
compliance  with priority. Violations  of priority and absence of
damage rules are  institutionalli enforced either administratively,
or through a system of water courts.  For example, in Colorado,any
right holder can bring litigation against anotkPer  user who  violates
these principles.
Licenses and Security
Some  aspects  of the  Australian  system  of water  allocation
results in water  rights that are significantly less secure than
those discussed above.  All water supplies are held by the state,
and rights to use are acquired by obtaining a license, which are
not prioritized.  Rather than relying on strict legal principles,
state officials have wide discretion in determining the conditions
that apply to licenses  (Delforce, Pigram, Musgrave and Anderson,
19°00).
The security of a  licenses is lessened by several factors.
First, the license can be modified at any time, at the discretion
of  governmental  agencies.  Second,  licenses  ate  not  granted  in
perpetuity;  they  expire  periodically.  Finally,  there  are  a
significant  number  of  "sleeper  licenses"  on the  books,  meaning
licenses that have been  granted,  but are not currently  in use.
These  sleeper  licenses are not  lost through nonuse, and can be
activated  at  any  time,  which  introduces  another  element  of
uncertainty  into the water allocation system.
The  security  of  water  rights  in  the  Western  U.  S.  is
compromised  by  sleeper  "reserved"  water  rights.  Reserved  water
rights are those accruing to Indian or other Federal reservations
of  land.  These  lands  carry  an  implicit  right  to  the  water
necessary to achieve the designated purpose of the land and carry
a priority date equal to the reservation date. Unlike other water
rights,  reserved  rights  are  not  lost  from  non  use.  To  date,
0reserved  rights are  largely unexercised  and unquantified within
this general concept, which creates great uncertainty. Under most
scenarios, the -ull and eventual use of these rights wil) likely
supplant a significant fraction of existing watsr uses.
An  all-knowing  governmental  body  could  theoretically
construct  a  system  o,  secure  licenses,  if  they  were  able  to
anticipate all eventualities,  and respond automatically to  changing
circumstances. On the other hand, if decerntralized  systems accoun_
for  external  impacts,  individual  transactions  tend  'o  produce
better  economic outcomes (Anderson,l9?.). However,  .he  problema of
water management often invol e more than efficiency alone.  Public
as  well  as  private  security  may  be  at  issue.  Political,
environmental and equity goals may also be involved.  As a result,
markets,  as well  as centralized bureaucracies  are inadequate in
meeting these challenges singlehandedly. A complicated mix of the
two is typically called for.
Lack of Security and The Rule of Intrusion
Thailand exemplifies the case where markat failures are
totally  ignored, with devastating  impacts on water security and
efficient use. The old say "not to decide, is to decide", certainly
applies to Thailand.  There are no formalized institutional rules
for water allocation  (Johnson, Patamatamkul,  Onchan and Tan-Kim-
Yong,1990), and in the absence of formal rules, the informal rule
of right by intrusion and capture applies  (Randall, 1983).
In this case, a water "right" is obtained simply  by diverting
water  from  the  stream.  However,  this  right  is, in no  sense,
secure. As the demand for wate-!r  grows, additional diversions from
the stream are not constrained from damaging existing use. If an
entity wishes to ire-rease  its  water security, the typical approach
is to simply increased efforts devoted to water capture, which may
negatively impact downstream users. The result is extreme overall
resource  insecurity.  Significant  pressure  exists  to  develop
institutional arrangements capable of dealing with the inevitable
chaos and conflict that results.
Informal, customary rights to water can be somewhat secure and
yet susceptible to intrusion.  In both India and Indonesia, water
rights  are  gained prescriptively,  that  is customary rights  are
recognized based on historical use of communal systems (Berkoff,
1991).  The security of such rights is  usually partially protected.
In general, such water users achieve considerable protection from
intrusion  from  outside the basin  in question.  Typically,  they
would not be afforded the same guarantees against additional users
within the basin itself.
7In the Philippines, prescriptive water law has been entirely
repealed  (Cruz,  Cornista  and  Dayan,  1987).  Until  recently,
Philippine wattr law  was based on Spanish water law that recognized
acquisitive prescr ption in  the use of public waters.  However, tile
current Water Code oxpressly reverses this principle.  Obviousiy,
historical use based on  presc?.iption  has become extremely insecure.
Establishing secuirity  in water use is necessary in order to
establish efficient wat3r use, but it  is not sufficient.  Security,
and  the  order  that  results,  is  a  prere-uisite  to  efficiency.
However  water  rights must  also  ha  flexible.  The  next  section
outlines the  flexibility issue in general and its importance to
efficiency.
THE IMPORTANCE OF FtjEXIBILITY  IN WATER ALLOCATION
In  order  to  facilitate  economic  well  being  and  growth,
institutiora'.  arrangements  must  accommodate  the  need  for
reallocating  water  over  time,  in  response  to  legitimate  and
accuratelv  represented  social  economic  need.  Institutions  are
critical is determining whether water transfers proceed smoothly
and in response  to bona  fide efficiency  concerns, whether  they
incorporate inappropriate  or  inaccurate considerations, or disallow
real'location  altogether.
Reallocation of water within and between sectors is supported
on grounds of economi- efficiency, wherein water is transferred to
its  highest valued use (Howe,  Schurmeier and Douglas, 1986; Hartman
and Seastone, 1970). Fluctuation in water demand and water supply
can  create  substantial  discrepancies  between  the  existing
allocation  cf  water  and  the  efficient  allocation  wherein  net
economic returns are maximized  (Vaux,1986).
Certainly, the developing world  faces substantial changes in
future water  supply and demand  conditions,  that  call for water
reallocation as part and parcel of an overall solution.  Certainly,
future  water  supplies  are  subject  to  change,  given  "regular"
drought  occurrences  as  well  as  atypical  changes  due  to
desertification,  climate change and the like. Decreases in water
quality are increasingly significant to water supply problems.
Demand condi  'ons are bound  to change as well.  Population
growth alone indicdtes  an increase in  water scarcity. Cestti (1989)
defines three categories of scarcity based on the number of people
competing for ons flow unit of water  (one million cubic meter per
year).  The  categories  are  l)adaptation  problems  at  500
people/mcm/yr,  2) absolute scarcity at 1000 people/mcm/yr and 3)
water  barrier  at  2000  people/mcm/yr.  Assuming  stationary
8population,  countries  in  category  1  include  China,  Cyprus,  El
Salvadur,  India,  Iraq, Mexico,  Sri  Lanka,  Sudan,  Thdiland,  and
Turkey.  Category 2 includes Ghana, Iran, Madagascar, Mauritania,
Peru, S. Africa, and Togo. Category 3 includes  Algeria  Cape Verde,
Egypt,  Israel Jordan, Morocco, Oman Saudi Arabia, Ayria, Tunisia
and Yemen.
Increases in irrigated acreage  in the developing world will
also place  additional demands  on  'Local  water  supplies.  Growth
rates in irrigated acreage averagad at about tLirty percent during
the  1970's  (Cestti,  1989).  In  some  areas,  urbanization  will
necessitate  reallocation.  Mexico  C.-y, Amman Jordan and Beijing
are  examples  of  cities  facing  wate.  shortages  in  the  face  of
growth.  Industrialization is also a  key factor in some parts of
the  world,  especially  the  newly  developed  economies  of
Asia.Continuation of this trend has very stubstantial  implications
for the reallocation of  water gsographically a, well as sectorally.
When  water  is  locked  in  historical  uses,  r-ather than
realloctited  as economic conditions change, efficienlcy  losses can be
substantial.  For example, in  terms of overall shor.tage,  Fallon and
Dixon  (1989) conclude  that  an  estimated  water  shortage  of  3.5
billion  cubic  meters  in  Beijing  in  the  year  2000  could  be
alleviated  through a combination  of technical and policy options
including reallocation within and among sect)rs.
Water  economists  in the  developed  world  have  increasingly
reliable  estimates  of the  savings  to be realized  through water
trades  and  transfers.  Vaux  (1986)  focuses  specifically  on
poten Lal trades from agricultural to urban use in California. He
estimates that reallocation of ten percent of agricultural water to
cities could yield benefits of  169 million dollars by the year 2000
and reduce overall water use.
Sirilarly, Kelso, Martin  and Mack  (1973), provide extensive
economic analysis of the Central Arizona Project.  Their study also
indicates that the structural project is uneconomical.  That  is,
growing  water  demands  could  be  met  at  lower  cost  through
reallocation of existing supplies.  Gisser and Johnson  (1983) and
Burness and Quirk(  )see the same sort of inefficiency elsewhere
in the Western U.S.
Given  that one accepts the  fact that reallocation of water
over space, uses and time is necessary and desirable in order to
maximize development benefits, the question becomes what vehiclZ
should be used to achieve such changes.  The answer lies in some
mix of administrative and market control.
The  mix of market and administrative  mechanisms  chosen.  anrd
used  will  necessarily  vary  between  countries.  The  efficiency
implications  of  particular  combinations  will  vary  somewhat
depending on local circumstances.  In general terms the degree to
9which e.:ther  approach dominates depends on the following factors.
First a country's e:xperience  with command and control vs. a market
based  economy will influence, to substantial  degree the type of
approach selected.  A country's stage in  development and historical
background  will  necessarily  impact  selection  of  water  transfer
mechanisms.
Second, the organizational skills and leadership ability held
by state  agencies versus  individual  water  users  is a  factor  in
reallocation  approaches.  Where  individuals  lack organizational
ability, markets may be linable  to function and a government agency
may  be  able  to  supply  the  integration  required  for  orderly
transfers  of water.  However, if agencies themselves are lacking
organizationally,  market failure may be replaced with government
failure.
Similarly,  a third set of considerations  is the analytical
skill  and  independence  of  an  agency  potentially  involved  in
crchestrating water transfers.  The agency must have the ability to
accurately  evaluate  the  economic  tradeoffs  (gains and  losses)
involved in  a potential transfer.  Moreover, the agency  must not be
biased  towards or against a particular  user group.  At the same
time  client  relationships  with  agriculture,  industry  and
municipalities  must  be maintained  in order  to have broad  based
political support.
Finally, a fourth consideration  is the scale of the transfer
involved.  In order for large scale transfers to be efficient, as
in water  resource management  in general,a  system wide evaluation
must  be undertaken  (Easter, Dixon  and Hufschmidt,  1986).  As a
rule, governments, rather  than individuals, are in  a position to do
so.If water transactions are taking place on a small scale within
use  type,  it  is more  likely  that  individuals  working  through
markets cain  function  effectively.  However, the larger  the scale of
the proposed water reallocation, the more likely it is that state
agencies must be involved to evaluate, negotiate, and implement  the
transfer.  For example,  in interbasin  transfers  or large  scale
transfers between use types, administrative mechanisms may play a
larger role.
The  foregoing principles not withstanding,  it is useful  to
characterizc alternative  approaches to water transfers, and typical
advantages  and disadvantages of each.  The  following paragraphs
discuss  a  varietv  of institutional  arrangements  that have  been
employed  to deal  with  changes  in  water  supply  and demand,  and
resulting water transfers. Fluctuating conditions that provide the
impetus for water reallocation can be either shortrun and longrun.
Supply-side  changes ten to be relatively shortrun  (e.g. drought)
but conceivably  could be long run  (  as in the case of climatic
change).  Demand-side changes are usually relatively longrun, or
permanent.  As a result, transfers elicited on these grounds tend
to be substantially more controversial.
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Times  of unusually short water supply or prolonged drought
call for special institutional arrangements for water allocation.
Coping  with  drought  often  calls  for reallocation  of water both
within and between sectors.  In order to minimize overall economic
disruption, the most profitable and drought sensitive enterprises
must be assured continued water supply, while less sensitive and
less  economically  important endeavors  must  be  sacrificed.  For
example, within agriculture,tree orchards should  have priority over
hay  production  on economic  grounds.  Between  sectors,  providing
municipal  water  at  the  expense  of  agriculture  is  usually
economically justified.  Institutional arrangements determine the
degree  of  difficulty  encountered  in  achieving  needed  water
reallocation.
Market Based Priority
Adaptation to drought in Colorado is achieved through market
reallocation  based  on the  institution  of  priority  coupled with
tradeability  (regarding ownership) and transferability  (regarding
location).  As explained previously, water rights are defined such
that  senior  (older) rights  are  fulfilled  prior  to  junior  (more
recent) rights. Therefore, rights are diffrn:entiated  with respect
to the probability  of receiving water  under  given precipitation
conditions. Priority becomes even more important in times of water
shortage. Of course,-there is no guarantee the within the initial
allocation of water, the most senior right carries the greatest net
economic  benetit.  Economically  efficient  reallocation  is made
possible  only because water  rights  are tradeable,  and therefore
flexible.
Drought sensitive enterprises may take one of two approaches
in  order  to  be  assured  of  water  supply  during  drought  years.
First, a sufficiently senior water right may be purchased from an
existing water user. The mora senior  a water  right is, the more
valuable  it  is  it  terns  of  certainty  of  supply.  Only  those
enterprises with large profit margins, or with great ability to pay
(e.g. municipalities)  will be in a position to buy senior water
rights.  Second, it may be possible to buy a "drought year option"
(Michelsen and Young, 1990).  In this case a contract is drawn up
wherein a right holder with a low valued use agrees, for a  monetary
consideration, to forego  water use and transfer it to a high valued
use,  under  conditions  of  drought.  This  alternative  does  not
require permanent water transfers and is, in all likelihood, less
disruptive to local economies when water shortages are fairly  rare.
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It  is  fairly  typical  for  water  allocation  during  drought
conditions  to be decided through bureaucratic means, via private
water  user groups or by the  state  itself.Various techniques are
used  by  bureaucracies  to  reallocated  water,  each with  specific
efficiency and equity implications.
Drought  year  water  allocation  in  Valencia,  Spain  is
representative  of  many  privately  organized  water  distribution
systems.  Private institutional arrangements specify that in times
of  shortage,  water  is  to  be  allocated  proportionate  to  land
holdings among irrigators (Maass and Anderson, 1978).  The result
is  greater  time  intervals  between  water  deliveries.  No
prioritization among farmers is made, indicating that the primary
goal is equity, rather than economic efficiency.  In some areas,
such  as  Pakistan,  proportionate  allocation  is  found  to  be
ineffective or unworkable, due to conveyance losses.  In response
to this physical problem, water allocation is prioritized based on
location,  i.e.,  proximity  to  head  waters  (Chaudhry and  Young,
1990).
In response  to the  1990-91 drought  in Thailand, the  Royal
Irrigation Department engaged in a kind of rationing. Officially,
water for electricity generation carries first priority.  This is
based  on  its  higher  economic  return  (Boonkrob,  Thongdeelert,
Ayuthdhaya and Sripim, 1991).  Consequently, reductions in acreage
for some crops were ordered. Other  plantings were delayed while
some were increased. Implicitly, this rationing may have mimicked
what  markets  would  accomplished,  but  without  compensation  and
transactions costs.
Recent events in  California demonstrate the force that natural
circumstances  can  have  on  the  pressure  for  more  flexible
institutional  arrangements.  California  is  a  state  that  has
historically  relied  reductions  in  overall  use  rather  than
reallocation  between  sectors  as  a  means  to  deal  with  water
shortage.  However,  in  February  of  1992,  after  five  years  of
drought, the California legislature and California Department of
Water Resources (CDWR)  abandoned rationing, in favor of a form of
trading.  A  "drought  emergency  water  bank"  was  established
(Macaulay, 1991).
The  state  wide  water  bank  allowed  market  like  transfers.
However, a significant amount of bureaucratic control is involved.
First, all trades are administered by CDWR using uniform contracts.
Based on expert economic advise, the price of water was fixed at
CDWR's buying price of $125 per acre foot and a selling price of
$175  per  acre  foot.  The  difference  was  estimated  to  cover
transportation, negotiation and administrative costs.
12The water bank program was highly successful in transferring
water  from  less  to mc-e  economically  sensitive  sectors  of  the
state. Over  600,000 acre feet of deli-erable water supplies were
purchased, with approxi.nately  400,000 acre feet sold and 200,000
kept as carry over and for fish and wildlife uses.  As expected,
the  big  sellers  were  farmers  in  Northern  California.  Water
purchases were made by farmers  with permanent crops and urban users
in Southern California, with over half going to the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California  (Macaulay, 1991).
Demand Side Impetus for Water Transfers
Transfers  of water  are often  stimulated  by changes  in the
economic  demand  for water.  The  most  typical  case  is  .l't of
general municipal and industrial growth. The result is p3  ,:re  to
move water between sectors (out of agriculture  into high  l  al  ,ed
uses) or between regions (from one locality to another).  'ever.
changes in demand for water also occur within sectors. Sh  .s 991)
suggests water markets are critical to farmers in India whc,  iav  not
share  in an  initial allocati.on  of  water,  yet  wish  acquir_  tne
resource in pursuit of economic opportunity.
Because  such  transfers  tend  to  be  permanent,  rather  than
temporary  as  in  the  case  of  drought,  they  are  usually  more
controversial.  Institutional arrangements  for dealing with this
type of transfer range from the absence of any rule, to complete
bans on transfers ,  to (perhaps  undue) institutional accommodation
of  permanent  transfers.  The  following  paragraphs  contrast
alternative  approaches  to  demand  side  transfers,  including the
advantages and problems associated with each type.
Institutional Voids for Transfer
The current situation in Thailand exemplifies a case where no
steadfast  rules  exist for either  intersectoral or  interregional
transfers.  The result  is near chaos,  and a growing demand  for
innovation ir.  water institutions to deal with the insecurity and
inefficiencies that result (Johnson,et.  al., 1990).  This applies to
transferability as well as general water allocation.
During the past decade, Thailand has experienced exponential
industrial economic growth, accompanied by a concomitant increase
in overall water demand.  Industrial users have met this demand by
constructing new diversion  works, or by pumping water from  existing
irrigation canals  (Johnson, et. al., 1990). This is done without
regard  to  its very  substantial  impact  on  the  water quality  or
quantity  available  to  downstream  users.  In  effect,  de  facto
transfers  have  occurred, as enabled  by  the  institutional void.
Water  reallocation  depends  solely  on  technology,  backed  by
political power.
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Thailand  may  be  justified  on  economic  grounds.  However,  no
institutional provision is made for formal purchase from existing
users. No compensation for reallocation occurs; water is  taken, not
traded.  These  transactions may  meet  the  criterion  of standard
benefit cost analysis, wherein those who gain could  (but  may not)
compensate losers and still be better off. However, a fundamental
equity  requirement  of  voluntary  market  transactions  (actual
compensation as required by Pareto optimality) has been violated,
making  such  transfers  ethically  offensive  and  economically
disruptive. The institutional void creates uncertainty and dampens
investment.
Bans on Permanent Water Transfers
In many societies, principles of fairness override efficiency
concerns when it comes to permanent water transfers.  For example,
the Great Lakes states in the U.S. officially denounce transfers of
Great Lakes water out of the region, regardless of the reason. Any
proposed transfer out of the region requires consensus approval by
all Great Lake states.  Therefore, any state has veto power.  Given
most transfers do impose  some costs, proposals for  moving water out
of the basin are almost guaranteed to fail. (It  must be noted that
Federal interstate commerce law  may override this arrangement among
States.)
Bans on permanent water transfers  are often acccmplished by
adopting institutional arrangements that make water appurtenant to
land.  This  principle  pervades many  areas  of  the  developed and
developing world  (Maass and Anderson,  1978). In the U.S., Elwood
Mead was very influential in  advancing the notion that water should
be appurtenant and not change in location.  This system is embedded
in Wyoming water law as well as elsewhere in the States.
The water allocation system in Valencia, Spain, is  typical of
many around the world.  Water rights are appurtenant to specific
tracts of land. In Spain, individual users belong to an irrigation
group.  Water  is  allocated  proportionately  among  landholders
according to the size of their holdings. Quoting from (Maass and
Anderson,  1987, p. 41)  .."the sale of water  or of the rights to
water is anathema to Valencians, where water is married to land and
cannot be divorced  from it."  Spanish institutional arrangements
establish  certainty  and  a  form  of  equity  at  the  expense  of
efficiency in water allocation.-
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In  parts  of  the  Western  U.S.,  notably  Colorado,  market
transfers of water are possible within  the overall institutional
framework.  However, transfers are subject to the absence of damage
rule. Any party (senior  or junior) who claims to be injured, either
in terms of quantity or quality of water availability, may bring
suit to stop the proposed transfer,  insuring external impacts on
other water users are considered.
The  effect  of  the  absence  of  damage  rule  p,ftaining  to
transfers has traditionally translated  into the notion that only
"consumptive" water use can be  permanently transferred, rather than
the  full amount withdrawn  from the  stream.  Return  flows  must
remain intact in order to prevent injury to downstream water users.
The  informal  "consumptive"  use  transfer  rule  has  been
complicated  by  the  introduction  of  instream  water  rights.
Environmental  uses  of water  are  increasingly  recognized,  which
usually involve a specific amount of water remaining in the stream
at  a  given  locality  ,  for  wildlife  or  recreational  use.  If
instream water rights are located near the site of a transfer, even
limiting  the  transfer  to  consumptive  use  only  may  impact  the
quantity of water available for an instream right.  In this case,
the  absence  of damage  rule  may  disallow  any transfer  of  water
(Livingston  and Miller, 1986)  . The problem is  particularly acute on
over  appropriated  streams  with  variable  flow.  A  California
Department of Water Resources report also documents this issue as
a  problem arising out of water bank operations  (Macaulay,1991).
Market based water transfers are not without problems (Saliba,
1987)  .There  are several factors  that hamper permanent intersectoral
water  reallocations.  These  include  hydrologic  and  technical
limitations, transactions costs,and secondary impacts. At least in
the case of the first two, institutions and technology can be used
to  minimize  their  impact.  The  last  consideration  is  more
complicated and is a significant concern in water transfers under
the  most  developed  institutional  arrangements.  The  following
paragraphs describe each consideration in turn.
Impacts of Infrastructure on Transfers and the Value of Water
Physical circumstances, as well as the economic value of water
in alternative uses, determine the gains from trade so critical to
market  transfers.  Transportation  costs  alone  may  stymie  a
potential  market  (Livingston, 1985).  Consider market  transfers
from agricultural to municipal use. Clearly, based on the economic
value  in use, municipal users would  be willing and able  to bid
water away from agricultural  users.  However, if  agricultural water
is not readily accessible to the municipality's natural or  man-made
conveyance system, the cost of transportation facilities  necessary
to complete the transfer may render the transaction uneconomical.
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justify the cost of physically connecting water systems.  Whenever
possible,  it makes economic sense  to utilize the existing water
courses  to  implement  water  transfers.  Barring  extreme
circumstances, it is useful for the analyst to think in terms of a
set  of  relatively  independent  market  regions  defined  by  water
basin,  rather  than envisioning  an  entire  region  or nation as a
viable water market.
In this context, it is clear  why the Colorado Big Thompson
project in Colorado is usually cited as an ideal, and certainly one
of  the  very  few,large  scale  water  market  in operation  today.
Large, centralized stored  water supplies are most amenable to water
marketing  because  transportation  and  return  flow  issues  are
minimized.  CBT project facilities connect three major watersheds
with a highly centralized stored water supply.
In  the  same  vein,  expanding  water  markets  nay  require
additional  physical  linkages.  The  Northern  Colorado  Water
Conservancy  District,  (the agency  that  operates  CBT water)  has
conducted a long term study of ways to accommodate uneven growth in
regional  water  demand.  The  result  is  a  proposal  to  develop
additional  infrastructure and to expand  integrated  (centralized)
water treatment (NCWCD,1991).  Shah  (1991)  also sees infrastructure
as key to the development of water markets in India.
Based on the discussion above, it is clear that many state and
federal  agencies  have the  opportunity  to provide  leadership  in
water  marketing.  Large  scale  water  supplies  are  typically
controlled by these agencies.  Unfortunately,  many of these same
agencies employ policies that explicitly prohibit gains from trade
via water transfers. Policy makers  should  consider institutional
innovations that allow efficient transfers.
Transactions Costs
The term "transaction  cost" refers to the monetary expense of
completing a particular transaction.  In this case the transaction
is  the  transfer  of  a  water  right.  Typical  transaction  cosrs
incurred in such a transfer include the cost of negotiation with
the other water user(s) involved and the costs of fulfilling legal
and/or  administrative  costs  associated  with  completing  the
transfer.
Rather  than being a minor consideration  in water transfers,
transaction costs have proven to be a. major element. They are often
substantial enough to delay or prevent water transfers altogether.
Transaction  costs have been  cited  as  the reason why more water
transfers  do not take place, even when  large differences in the
value of water in alternative uses exist  (Young, 1986; Ingram and
Oggins, 1990).  Ingram and Oggins(1990)  note that a transfer of
15,000  acre  feet  of  water  in  Nevada  required  15  months  of
16transaction  time  and that in Utah,  7 of the 85 million dollars
spent of water rights for the Intermountain Power Project went to
lawyers and engineers.
A  pending  water  transfer  in Colorado  also  exemplifies  the
complexities  in  transaction,  even  under  the  most  market  like
conditions.  Beginning in 1985,in an effort  to procure municipal
water  supplies,  the  Denver  suburb  of  Thornton  purchased
approximately  20,000  irrigated  acres  and  the  dater  shares
associated with them. In this case agricultural water is provided
by Water  Supply  and Storage Company  in rural northern Colorado.
Simultaneously,  Thornton  applied  for  roughly  18,000  a.f.  of
unappropriated water on the Poudre River.
Certainly, the amount  Thornton is willing to pay for  water far
exceeds the value of water in  agriculture.  On these grounds, there
should be substartia. gains from trade.Despite the basic economic
incentive  involved,  the  actual  transaction  has  been  very
complicated.  After six years, the transfer remains in limbo in  the
court system. There are a variety of agencies  involved, each of
which have spent untold amounts of money to defend their position.
While the irrigation company itself initially balked at the
transfer,  with  great  concern  about  Thornton  monopolizing  its
supply, they  were  soon able to reach  agreement.  However, both
Cache  La  Poudre  Water  User  Association  and  Northern  Colorado
Conservancy  District are claiming  injury.  The former agency is
concerned  mainly  about  the quantity  of  water  available  to  its
members  if the transfer occurs.  They claim Thornton's  transfer
will  affect  the timing and amount  of raturn  flows in the Poudre
River, and will stymie many long term exchange arrangements on the
river.
NCWCD  is also  concerned with  the  changes  in water quality
arising from the proposed transfer, especially considering quickly
evolving  water  quality regulations.  NCWCD  also  contests water
applications  that  are  based  on  dubious  population  growth
projections. An over arching issue also pertains to the amount of
WSSC water that is subject to the regular "consumptive use" rule
and  the  amount  that  is  exempt,  due  to  special  "importation"
considerations.
As  explained  previously,  the  only  constraint  to  water
acquisition  or transfer  in Colorado  is the  "absence of damage"
rule.  That is, any party who claims injury due to the transfer may
appeal  to the  courts. Establishing  injury  takes  legal time and
money,  which  amounts to transaction cost. Many  transfers of the
type Thornton is proposing are expected in the future.  The final
decision  on  the  proposed  Thornton  transfer  will  be  precedent
setting.  One thing is very clear.  Market  based water transfers
will have to overcome very substantial transaction costs in order
to become a reality.
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As  discussed  in the  context  of  market  failure,  efficient
resource  use  requires  that  externalities  be  accounted  for  in
decisions to transfer water. Simply stated, this means that  any
change  in water allocation cannot  have uncompensated  effects on
other water users.  However, this stipulation does not take into
consideration thiat  there may be other parties, who are not water
users, who are adversely impacted. These "secondary impacts" tend
to be on people who supply water users and the community at large
(Howe and Easter, 1971).
Including  impacts on  suppliers  and  community  tax  base  is
relatively simple.  Theoretically, these impacts are negligible if
full employment exists and resources are completely mobile. Under
these conditions,  losses in the water selling area are offset by
gains  in the purchasing  area.  However,  some unemployment,  and
imperfect resource mobility is the rule, rather than the exception.
Moreover case, the distribution of economic activity is of concern
to local  officials,  regardless  of aggregate  impacts  (Nunn,1985;
Fort Collins Coloradoan, 1987).  Input-output analysis can be used
to  estimate  secondary  impacts  (Young, 1984).  A  study  of the
California water bank shows significant and differential secondary
impacts by crop type and by region  (Macaulay, 1991).
Beyond  economically identifiable third party impacts, water
transfers  are often objected to on more  general ethical grounds
(Brown, McDonald, Tysseling and DuMars, 1982). Around the world,
transfers  are  often  resisted  because  they  may  engender
"speculation",  "capitalist accumulation"(Maass,  1990) and "water
hogging".  There is also evidence that community members perceive
a loss in opportunity  for growth,  a loss of culture and control
over  the  future  (Ingram,  1990)  and  an  unfounded  emphasis  on
individual  over  community  values  (Nunn,1990)  when  water  is
transferred permanently out of a locality.
Administrative Systems for Transfer
Certainly,  market  systems  for  water  transfers  are  the
exception,  rather  than  the  rule,  throughout  the  world.  Many
countries, because of inexperience with  market systems, recognition
of the problems outlined  above or simply because of historical,
cu'tural and political circumstances, have adopted administrative
systems that reallocate water.  The following paragraphs describe
some alternative administrative approaches that have been taken,
along with some discussion about their strengths and weaknesses.
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experience  or  institutional  foundation  necessary  to  undergird
market transfers of  water  (Berkoff).  Unfortunately, many of the
administrative  systems in place  also  lack the basin-wide  focus,
organizational  skills  ,  independence  and  technical  information
required to implement efficient water reallocation.
The  Philippines  exemplifies  countries  that  face  serious
problems in water administration (Cruz, Cornista and Dayan, 1987).
Specifically,  this  study  reports  that  staff  charged  with
implementation  of  the  current  Water  Code  lacks  the  technical
ability to estimate true water  availability  and to evaluate the
impact  of  water  allocations  on  third  parties  (exnernalities).
Moreover, there is a systematic bias in water allocation in favor
of  landowners  and  against  irrigators.  Finally,  due  to
organizational problems, the process is rife with delays.
However,  there  are  examples  of  relatively  efficient
administrative  systems in Asia.  Management  of the Mahawela  in
SriLanka  and  the  Bhakhra  Beas  Management  Board  in India  come
fairly  close to meeting the criteria for efficient water allocation
(Berkoff, 1991). Both employ a basin-wide focus and use relatively
sophisticated evaluation techniques. Real time management is  based
on a yearly seasonal plan, and subsequently on monthly policy and
weekly technical meetings.
In Australia,  institutions  for water  transfer are evolving
rapidly.  There  are  increasing  pressures  to  develop  water
institutions that are flexible, because economic development has
been  impeded  by  fixed  allocations  of  water.  Currently,  the
institutional  system  is  somewhere  between  a  complete  ban  on
transfers and voluntary market  transfers.  Until recently, water
rights were attached to land and not officially transferable. In
practice, transfers were achieved primarily through changing the
conditions attached to permits, at the time they are renewed.
The state retains the power to change the conditions attached
to  permits,  thereby reallocating  water,  based  on the perceived
relative  importance  of  various  sectors  and  enterprises  within
sectors.  Conceivably, the  intent  may be  to mimic what  markets
would accomplish.  However, given the information intensive nature
of such a task, and the great advantages of a price system in this
regard, it is doubtful a centralized agency would accomplish this
reallocation efficiently.
Since the middle 1980's,  however, in response to the problems
inflexibility generated, institutional arrangements are  changing to
accommodate  transfers. However, they must be pursued through and
sanctified by the state bureaucracy. Additional conditions may be
attached to the transfer on a case by case basis (Maass, 1990). It
is  significant  that  the  price  attached  to  the  transfer  is
negotiated without state interference.
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subject  to  agency  conditions  including  price  restrictions.  For
example, Kern County Water Agency  stipulates that any water sold
through the "pool" cannot carry a price in excess of the original
cost  of  the  water  (Livingston, 1982).  Essentially,  the  policy
states that no profit may be achieved via transfers. This  policy
presumably  discourages  speculation, a  recurrent  theme  in public
policy debate about water transfers. Unfortunatel-, in the process
of  negating  profit,  the  vital  mechanism  that  spurs  efficiency
through competition is rendered inoperable.
In the United  States, New Mexico  employs  an administrative
system for water reallocations, that appears to be quite efficient.
Any individual may apply for a  water transfer. The application  will
be approved "if the state engineer determines  that the change  is
not detrimental to existing water rights, is not contrary to the
conservation of water within the state, and is not detrimental to
the  public  welfare  of  the  state  (Nu-nn  and  BenDavid,  (1991).
Therefore,  great  responsibility  for  determining  economic  merit
rests on the state engineer.
Evidence suggests that in fact, most transfer decisions have
been based on an evaluation of aggregate benefits and cost, which
mimics the incentives that drive markets.  Historically, decisions
have been  independent, in that the users  to whom benefits and
costs  accrued  has  not  been  a  concern,  per  ss.  However,
increasingly, secondary impacts have become a consideration. Given
an effective organization and a system wide scope, this system has
some great advantages in terms of reducing transactions costs.
SUMMARY
The foregoing discussion rests on the well known premise that
in order to foster economic efficiency, rights to water resources
must be both secure and flexible. Designing  institutions to deal
with the physical peculiarities of water in a way that establishes
sensible  incentives  and  enables  efficient  resource  use  is
complicated, at the very least.
Fundamentally,establishing security in water rights requires
that water users are protected against intrusion by others.  This
is  challenging  given  that  water  users  are  naturally
interdependent.Security does not mean that one must be juaranteed
an exact amount of water, all the time.  Rather, security means
knowing the probability of water  availability, arid  being certain
about allocation procedures under changing circumstances.
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against  new  users  and  against  erratic  acts  by  policy  makers.
Australian's  face  uncertainty  due  to  a  substantial  number  of
sleeper rights.  Americans face uncertainty due to newly activated
reserved  rights  and  changes  in  environmental  policy.  Perhaps
perfect security is unattainable in an ever changing world.
Economic efficiency in water allocation, in response to short
term supply changes, such as drought, requires that economically
sensitive  sectors  take  precedence  over  less  sensitive  or  more
adaptive sectors.  This can be accomplished through markets or by
administrative means(i.e. by government  agencies or private water
user  groups).  In a market scheme,  rights must be differentiated
according  to  the  probability  of  receiving  water  in  times  of
shortage. High valued uses can then either acquire high probability
rights permanently, or  can negotiate an option to be exercised only
in drought years.
There  is  less  agreement  among  experts  about  designing
institutions to provide flexibility in  water allocation in response
to long run changes in water demand.  Certainly, no one interested
in  economic  efficiency  would  suggest  either  a  complete ban  on
transfers  or  completelv  unrestrained  transfers.  The  basic
difficulty  is in insuring that water transactions allow economic
development and do not impose externalities on other water users.
Market mechanisms for water transfer can entail  substantial
transaction  costs, which  threaten  to delay  or stymie  transfers
altogether. Moreover, third party and community impacts  continue to
be of concern to those involved in water transfers.  Local citizens
and officials raise issues concerning the distribution of economic
activity, rather than its aggregate level  (economic efficiency).
Perhaps  these  issues  are  negligible  when  the  amount  of  water
transferred is small in  proportion to total supply.  However, when
the  transfer  threatens  the  fundamental  economic  base  of  a
community, these concerns deserve more consideration.
Successful  water  institutions  require a  delicate  interplay
between administrative and market control.  Institutions establish
the basis for  market and can assure competitive conditions.  Water
agencies will always  be involved in allocation, given the economies
of scale in centralized water management. Structuring institutions
such that the overall incentive that emerge foster sound economic
development  poses  a  critical  challenge  for  water  resource
professionals.
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